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RECENT DECISIONS
answer the demands of cleanliness, which alone can insure the health
of the barber's patrons; (2) That barber shops may become lounging
places for the idle and dissipated, and therefore a menace to minors;
and (3) That the barber shop in front may be a blind for a den of
thieves, professional gamblers, gangsters and racketeers behind. Two
strong dissenting opinions are published along with the majority opinion in this case. It is submitted that they are of greater merit. In his
dissenting opinion, speaking of the prohibitory ordinance passed by
the city of Zanesville, Judge Jones says: "This ordinance may be such
that would receive the approval of a Soviet or Fascist regime; but its
Alpha and Omega amounts to a regimentation of both labor and industry ... Neither the N. R. A. in the heyday of its activities nor the
American Federation of Labor has asked for such drastic regulation of
American labor and industry . . . Why are the closing hours at 6
o'clock, P. M., or on Thursday afternoon so sacrosanct? The public
welfare is the welfare of the people. They best know when they desirf
such service, and the trade can be depended upon to render that service
at the hours the public demands it. Thousands of neighborhood shops
exist in Ohio communities having many more thousands of customers
employed in daytime work in offices, shops and factories, customers
who have little or no opportunity of seeking a barber's service before
6:00 o'clock, P. M.; nor have they such opportunity before 8:00
o'clock, A. M., when they must be at their work or on their way thereto. Shall -that portion of the public be deprived of their liberty of action by the ipse dixit of some municipal council? I hold that the ordinance in question is arbitrary, unreasonable, and places an undue
restraint upon the personal liberties of -the public and upon those engaged in the pursuit of a lawful business." The majority opinion carried to its logical conclusionj opens the door to like prohibitory regulation against many soft-drink parlors, small restaurants, cigar stores
and other places of like nature where people are wont to congregate
at night-a situation hardly justifiable under our present system of
government.
John J. Locher, Jr.
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MORTGAGES-ABsoLuTE DEED AS A MORTGAGE.-A recent case presents an unusual aspect of the general principle that an absolute deed may be shown to be
a mortgage. The plaintiffs brought an action to recover the sum of $9,000, an
alleged loan made to the defendant by their testator and secured by an absolute
deed. Simultaneously with the execution of the deed, the defendant and the
testator executed an instrument under seal providing that the defendant was to
pay: (1) For all necessary repairs on the property conveyed by the deed; (2) All
taxes and assessments on this property; (3) The testator the sum of $300 per
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year in semi-annual installments (which would be at the rate of 6 per centurn
mortgage interest on the sum of $5,000); and (4) All premiums on insurance
policies. The defendant was permitted to retain possession. The property conveyed was subject to a mortgage executed in favor of a third person. Several
witnesses testified that the transaction was a loan rather than an outright
sale. The $5,000 was in excess of the value of the equity of redemption in the
property conveyed by the deed. The defendant contended that the transaction
constituted a sale, rather than a mortgage. The court held that the plaintiffs were
entitled to recover. Chase Nat. Bank oj City of New York v. Tover, 183 N. Y.
S. 832 (1935).
The general rule seems to be, especially in jurisdictions where the distinctions
between legal and equitable actions are and have been largely observed, that
parol evidence is not admissible in an action at law to show a conveyance absolute upon its face was intended to operate as a mortgage. MORTGAGES, 19 R. C.
L. 253; Flint v. Sheldon, 13 Mass. 443 (1816); Hogel v. Lindell, 10 Mo. 483
(1847). The reasons that have been given for this rule are: (1) The admission
of parol evidence in such a case by a court of law is prohibited by the statute
of frauds of the particular jurisdiction; (2) A written instrument cannot be
varied or contradicted by parol evidence; and (3) The admission of parol evidence in such a case would go to establish a trust, that is, an agreement on the
part of the grantee to reconvey the premises to the grantor upon the payment
of a certain sum of money with interest, and this is prohibited by statute, in
some states. Ragan v. Walker, 1 Wis. 527 (1853); Flint v. Sheldon, supra;
MORTGAGES, 19 R. C. L. 253.

The equity of redemption is an inseparable incident to a mortrage. It arises out
of the nature of the transaction, and it is not created by the deed or other Instrument of the parties. So the admission of parol evidence in such cases does
not establish an interest or trust in land, contrary to provisions of statutes of
fraud or statutes prohibiting the establishment of trusts in land by parol evidence.
See Rogan v. Walker, supra. Neither is the parol evidence rule violated in such
cases. This rule prohibits the variance in their signification or explanation of
deeds and specialties by parol evidence, if the terms of such instruments are
capable of a sensible explanation of themselves. But to admit parol evidence to
show that an absolute deed was intended to operate as a mortgage does not violate this rule. Such evidence does not vary the deed, but it maintains the equity
which attaches to the transaction inherently, and which the deed does not create
and cannot destroy. See Rogan v. Walker, siprra.
In some jurisdictions it has been held that parol evidence is admissible in an
action at law for the purpose of showing that an absolute deed was intended to
operate as a mortgage. Despard v. Walbridge, 15 N. Y. 374 (1857); Jackson v.
Lodge, 36 Cal. 28 (1868); Walls v. Endel, 20 Fla. 86 (1883); McAnulty v.
Seick, 59 Iowa 586, 13 N. W. 743 (1882) (bill of sale). These decisions are from
code states; and in two of them (Despard v. Walbridge and Walls v. Endel) the
courts emphasized the code provisions allowing equitable defenses in actions at
law.
From a very early date parol evidence was admitted in equity to show that
a deed absolute in form was executed as security for a debt. Professor Walsh
says that the earliest case of this kind was Y. B. 9 Edw. IV, 25, 34 (1470), "in
which the law court stated that the Chancellor would give relief in such cases."
WALSH, A TREATISE ON MORTGAGES 34, 1). 1.

While the decisions in the United States are uniform that in a court of equity
an absolute deed may be shown to be a mortgage, there is a diversity of opinion
as to the grounds on which jurisdiction in such cases rests. In some of the cases,
epecially some of the early decisions, the doctrine does not apply except in
cases where there is some ordinary, ground of equity jurisdiction, such as fraud,
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accident or mistake. I BEACH, COMMENTARIES ON MODERN EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
(1892) § 407; Annotation, L. R. A. 1916B, 18. But in most jurisdictions, and especially in the recent decisions, fraud, accident or mistake is not essential in an
action for relief and to give effect to the intention of the parties. 1 BEACH, CoMmENTARIUS ON MODERN EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (1892) § 407; Annotation, L. R.
A. 1916B, 18. In some cases the doctrine is asserted that fraud in the use of
such an instrument is as much a ground for the interposition of equity as fraud
in the execution. Pierce v. Robinson, 13 Cal. 116 (1859).
In North Carolina the rule is said to be that "a deed absolute upon its face
cannot be converted into a mortgage unless it shall be established thaU the clause
of defeasance was omitted by ignorance, mistake, fraud, or undue influence."
Perry v. Southern Surety Co., 129 N. E. 721, 723 (N. C. 1925).
There are various circumstances which will show that a deed absolute upon
its face was intended to operate as a morlgage. "The existence and continuance
of a debt is said to be a well nigh infallible evidence that the instrument was intended as a mortgage; and the payment of interest upon the debt, or the extension of time of payment, is generally conclusive evidence of this fact. But, on the
contrary, the absence of any written acknowledgment of the debt, or express
promise to pay, is far from being conclusive. Whether the transaction is a mortgage is to be determined by the answer to the inquiry whether it was the intention of the parties to secure the payment of the debt or extinguish it. Inadequacy or price is also an important element in establishing the character of
the transaction; and another circumstance that will have much weight is the continuance of the grantor in the use and occupation of the land as owner after
the apparent sale and conveyance." 1 BEACH, COmmENTARES ON MODEM EQuirY
JURISPRUDENCE (1892) § 412.
The contention that a deed absolute upon its face was intended to operate as
a mortgage is one that is usually made by the debtor-grantor in the particular
transaction. But, as in the principal case, the contention has not infrequently been
made by the creditor-grantee in the deed. See: Bryan v. Cowart, 21 Ala. 92
(1852); Stone v. Nix, 101 Ga. 290, 28 S. E. 840 (1897); Reid v. McMillan, 189
Ill.
411, 59 N. E. 948 (1901); Herron v. Herron, 91 Ind. 278 (1883); McMill4n
v. Bissell, 63 Mich. 66, 29 N. W. 737 (1886); Forest Lake State Bank v. Ekstrand, 112 Minn. 412, 128 N. W. 455 (1910); Shields v. Simonton, 65 W. Va.
179, 63 S. E. 972 (1909); White v. Daniell, 141 Wis. 273, 124 N. W. 405 (1910).
It is not uncommon for persons to lend money on securities, of which they do
not wish to become permanent owners, even though the securitiesmay be ample
to indemnify the creditor and exceed in value the amount of the loan. See Bryan
v. Cowart, supra. Regardless of whether the securities exceed the amount of the
loan, the creditor is entitled to deal with the security in accordance with the
actual intention of the parties at the time the transaction was entered into. As the
principal case shows, the security may not have been ample indemnity, or it may
depreciate in value, and the resulting loss would be thrown on the lender, when
he had really protected himself against it by the terms of the agreement with the
borrower.
Francis Dunn, Jr.
PARENT AND CHID--AcTioNs

BETWEEN PARENT AND CHI.--In Duffy v. Duf-

fy, 178 AtI. 165 (Pa. 1935), the plaintiff sued her minor son for injuries due to
his negligent operation of the car in which they were riding. The court denied
relief mainly on the converse of the proposition, that an unemancipated minor
may not maintain an action against the parent for personal injuries.
The usual reason for such a rule is that to give a minor child a right of action
against the parent would tend to bring discord into the family and to disrupt the
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peace and harmony of the household. However, there is no rule at the common
law barring actions between parent and child for personal injuries to latter.
EvxasLEY, Dom Tic RELATIONS (1885) 601. Most of the early common-law writers intimate that a minor child may have a cause of action for unreasonable
chastisement by the parent. A few early cases in England have allowed children
to maintain actions against their parents. Roberts v. Rober-ts, Hard. 96, 145 Eng.
Rep. 399 (1657) (action by infant against her father to enjoin the commission
of waste); Morgan v. Morgan, I Atk. 4, 89, 26 Eng. Rep. 310 (1737) (account
decreed in favor of infant against parent).
Before 1891 several cases allowed recovery against persons in loco parentis.
Fitzgerald v. Northcote, 4 F. & F. 656 (1865) (child recovered a verdict against
his school master for assault and false imprisonment); Gould v. Christianson,Fed.
Cas. No. 5,636 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1836) (shipmaster was held liable for assault and battery of a minor child); Nelson v. Johansen 18 Neb. 180, 24 N. W.
730 (1885) (held that an action for negligence in not properly clothing a minor
child would lie in its favor against a guardian).
Since 1891 the first case involving the right to sue a parent arose in the
United States. In Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891), it was held
that a minor daughter had no action for false imprisonment against her mother.
This decision was followed by many more and remains today the law in the
United States. An extreme case is Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788

(1905). A father had been convicted of rape upon his minor daughter and had
been sentenced to imprisonment. The daughter sued for damages and a verdict in
her favor was reversed. The court approved the doctrine of domestic tranquility
and as a further reason continued: "Outside of these reasons which affect public
policy, another reason, which seems almost to be reductio ad absurdum, is that,
if a child should recover a judgment from a parent, in the event of its death the
parent would become heir to the very property which had been wrested by the
law from him." But see Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 150 Atl. 905, 71 A.
L. R. 1055 (1930), wherein the court said family life ought not to be used as a
cloak for intended wrong.
Many cases have arisen due to negligent operation of automobiles and in all
of them the courts have denied recovery by the child. In most of the cases the
father carried liability insurance. In Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R. I. 131, 131 Al.
198 (1925), a five-year-old child was riding on the running board of her father's
car with his permission when she was thrown under the wheels and seriously injured. No recovery was allowed. While the opposite rule seems to be more reasonable, but as yet it is only supported by the dissenting opinions in Small v.
Morrison, 185 N. C. 577, 118 S. E. 12, 31 A. L. R. 1135 (1923), and Wick v.
Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N. W. 787, 52 A. L. R. 1113 (1927), and a dictum in
Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra (where the minor child was in fact emancipated). The
only case squarely recognizing a cause of action at law for negligent injuries is
a recent Canadian case, Fidelity and Casualty -Co. v. Marchand, 9 D. L. R. 157
(1924), adopting the theory of accountability under a statute declaring that there
is liability for damage caused by fault, and denying the existence of any public
policy forbidding actions between parent and child. The court, in the course of
its opinion, said: "However repugnant it may seem that a minor child should
sue his own father, although it would probably be equally repugnant that a
child injured by his father's negligent act, perhaps maimed for life, should have
no redress for the damages he has suffered."
The reasons usually given for denying liability are: (1) That to give a child
a right to sue would tend to disrupt family life; (2) That children would become unruly; (3) The possibility of succession through heirship by the parent;
(4) Depletion of the family exchequer, which should be held for the benefit of
all. Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra. Judge Crownhart, dissenting, in Wick v. Wick,
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supra, answers the first reason by these questions: "But is there any more danger
of disrupting family life by permitting an infant to sue for injury to his person
than for injury to his property rights? Why not the. same rule as to injuries
to his person as to his property? The Constitution classifies the rights together
and on an equality."
The second reason that children would tend to become unruly if they have a
right to legal redress for malicious assaults seems a far-fetched deduction to
Chief Justice Peaslee, in Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra: "It smacks of the abandoned
notion that ignorance and blind obedience of the servient class is necessary to
their proper control."
The third contention, that the possibility of succession through heirship by
the parent, is a remote contingency, equally applicable to actions concerning property. The depletion of the family exchequer theory ignores the parent's power
to distribute his favors as he will, and leaves out of the picture the depletion
of the child's assets of health and strength through injury.
As representative of the many cases involving automobile accidents in all of
which the courts have denied recovery against an insurance company is Small
v. Morrison, supra. Chief Justice Clark, in his elaborate and convincing dissenting opinion, states the facts as follows: "This is an action by a child injured in
an automobile accident, seeking to recover damages for negligence against the insurance company upon its contract to indemnify her father for any damages
caused by his negligence in the operation of his machine. The indemnity company
in setting up the plea that the child cannot sue the father is not seeking to carry
out the Fifth Commandment or to enforce relations between parents and children,
but to exempt itself from its obligation to the father, made in consideration of
his money paid for that purpose, of reimbursing him for any damages which might
be caused to anyone by his operation of the machine. There is no statute and no
common law forbidding the child to make this recovery to which besides it is
entitled under the very terms of the contract as well as under the general law
as being a beneficiary therein."
It seems that the sole debatable excuse for the denial of a child's right to sue
is the affect a suit would have upon discipline and family life. "If, therefore, the
situation is such that the suit will not affect those matters at all, the reason
for the theory fails and should not be applied." Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra.
As the law now stands, parens are not liable to respond in damages for personal injuries to their children. There is, however, criminal liability for excesses.
Fletcher v. Illinois, 52 Ill. 395 (1869); Hinkle v. State, 127 Ind. 490 (1890).
The minority decisions and dicta would permit recovery for excessive injuries
done in breach of parental duties. Professor McCurdy has suggested several solutions to the problem one of which is as follows: "Privilege, either absolute or
qualified, in respect to parental discipline and control, and in respect to the
conduct of the domestic establishment. If the privilege is absolute, there would
be no civil liability, regardless of when the suit is brought, for those matters
within parental discipline and control, and for the conduct of the domestic establishment; but there would be ordinary liability in respect to other matters.
If the privilege, so confined, is qualified, then the question is one as to the merits
in all cases, with a rather wide scope of discretion in some conduct. Since parental discipline and control and the conduct of the domestic establishment are at
the root of the denial of a cause of action, it would seem that the denial ihould,
at least, he so confined, even if it be felt undesirable to make the privilege only
a qualified one. It is submitted that a privilege, either absolute or qualified, thus
confined, is the rational solution, against which can be urged only reasons of
nebulous policy." McCurdy, Torts Between Personas in Domestic Relation (1930)
43 HARV. L. REV. 1030.
Chares M. Peroni.

